The case is Davis v. Davis, 2019 IL App (3d) 170744. The parties were divorced in 2012. Husband believed that his wife had violated the postmarital agreement, but instead of filing a claim in the Divorce case he filed a breach of contract lawsuit. His case was dismissed. The dismissal was affirmed on appeal but the Appellate Court reversed the denial of Rule 137 sanctions. The court found that the filing of the breach of contract action violated Rule 137 and awarded wife her legal fees associated with defending the case:
¶18. The court found that dismissal was warranted because affirmative matter defeated Michael’s claim. The court reasoned that the action was “a divorce court matter” and should have been brought in the dissolution action. We agree with the trial court. Dissolution proceedings are designed to dispose of all matters connected with the dissolution of a marriage, including the parties’ attorney fees. See 750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2016). The dissolution proceedings and the breach of contract action were intertwined asthey were both based on the postmarital agreement. Bringing this claim in the dissolution action would not result in the joining of distinct and independent matters or require separate briefs, defenses, or the joinder of claims against multiple defendants. Both the dissolution action and the breach of contract action relied on the postmarital agreement for resolution. Leann was the only defendant, and there was no one else to join. The doctrine of multifariousness is not applicable under these facts. The dissolution action, which was pending at the time Michael brought the breach of contract action, was the appropriate forum for Michael to seek attorney fees. We find the trial court’s dismissal on this alternative ground was also proper…..
¶25. We determine that sanctions under both Rule 137 and Rule 375 are warranted. We find that Michael lacked a legal or factual basis to pursue his breach of contract action and to appeal it. He reasoned that his breach ofcontract action was independent of the dissolution proceedings. Nevertheless, he relies on the postmarital agreement to support both his dissolution claim and his breach of contract claim, indicating that he wasaware both causes of action were based on the same set of facts. Moreover, after contesting the validity of the postmarital agreement, Leann complied with its terms and provisions negating any basis for a breach. In essence, Michael attempted an end-around of his obligations under the postmarital agreement to be obligated for his own legal expenses. His filing the breach of contract action and the appeal of its dismissal unnecessarily extended proceedings between the parties. Because there was no basis for Michael’s breach of contract claim, his pursuit of the action can only be directed to harass Leann.
¶ 26 We thus direct Michael to pay the cost to Leann of defending his action at both the trial and appellatecourts. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 366 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) (this court may enter any judgment that should have been entered in the trial court). Leann’s attorney should present to this court an affidavit and billing records distinguishing between the trial and appellate work so we may enter proper sanctions amount under each rule. Amadeo v. Gaynor, 299 Ill. App. 3d 696, 706 (1998) (court determined sanctions amount based on attorney affidavit and billing records). Leann has offered to supply this court with the necessary financialinformation within seven days, and we request that she so submit the affidavit and billing records within seven days after issuance of this opinion. We will enter an order specifying the amount due and allow Michael 14 days to either pay Leann or challenge her accounting. We further direct Michael to pay Leann directly through her counsel.
Comment: Don’t try to avoid the divorce court or the divorce judge by filing a “contract” claim in another court.
Illinois Procedure and Sanctions Decisions 