In Amen v. Attiah, 2023 IL App (2d) 220031-U, the Illinois Appellate Court upheld sanctions awards in three cases where the same plaintiff requested no contact orders against three different people. The underlying dispute was between citizens and the school board, of which Amen was a member. The dispute concerned whether or not to return to in person learning. Each petition argued that there were threatening statements in facebook posts, but the posts were not attached to the petitions. The petition was a member of a school board. The Appellate Court affirmed the award of Rule 137 sanctions.
¶ 48 The record supports the trial court’s findings for Rule 137 sanctions against Amen due to the untrue allegations littered throughout her petitions. See supra ¶ 25. The evidence also fully supports the notion that sanctions were appropriate as the allegations in Amen’s petitions were wholly unsupported by facts or law. Indeed, the evidence tended to show that the petitions were designed to stifle respondents rights to speak out against Amen’s effort to gain re-election to the school board. The trial court explicitly found as such by noting
“This is not a situation where there is no harm from petitioner asking for a motion to be granted. While not dispositive of the outcome, Petitioner used her status as a public official to intimidate ordinary citizens. Worse, this petition was filed one day after a respondent demanded the school board act against Petitioner for her public campaign against them. It’s obvious to the Court that Petitioner wished to show them the consequences of public disagreement with her and quash their campaign and criticism of her. Oddly, these respondents had little to no contact with Petitioner. Can you imagine if a local mayor sought court action against a constituent or constituents for little more than online campaigning against that mayor? There’s essentially no difference between that scenario and this. Someone who dares to fight City Hall should be able to do so without fear of meritless litigation. It’s not lost on the court that Petitioner labels herself as a criminal defense attorney and civil rights attorney while seeking this claim against ordinary citizens, though her status as an attorney is not essential to the court’s finding.”
Amen takes further issue with the last sentence in the above findings. She asserts that the trial court improperly relied on her status as an attorney in granting respondents’ motions for sanctions. This assertion is meritless. Rule 137 applies to both attorneys and litigants. See IL. S. Ct. R. 137(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018). Throughout the proceedings Amen referred to herself as an attorney. She took issue in her petitions with respondents’ comments on her advertisement for services as an attorney. At no point in the underlying proceedings did she object or otherwise complain about being labeled as such. The trial court’s reference to her status as a criminal defense attorney in no way indicates that it relied on that status in granting the motions for sanctions. As Rule 137 applies equally to both attorneys and litigants, her complaints on this issue are a non-event.
¶ 49 Equally meritless is Amen’s assertion that the trial court treated the hearing on respondents’ motions for sanctions as a plenary hearing for an order of protection. The argument is based on the trial court’s reference to the hearing as an “OP” near the end of the hearing on September 22, 2021. Burton then corrected the trial court by noting that it was a motion for sanctions brought by respondents’ counsel. The court then tells Burton, “You are right.” At the beginning of that hearing, the trial court referred to the matter as “a Motion for Sanctions and movant in this case is respondent.” The order awarding sanctions to respondents repeatedly refers to the motions for Rule 137 sanctions. To state it mildly, Amen’s assertion that the trial was treated as a plenary hearing for an order of protection is based on a momentary misstatement by the trial court as opposed to any theory grounded in Illinois law or a reasonable person’s ability to read the report of proceedings.
¶ 50 In sum, the trial court’s award of sanctions and fees in favor of respondents was not an abuse of discretion. The detailed order is supported by the evidence presented and we will not disturb those findings here.
Comment: the court seemed concerned that Amen was using the requests for protective orders to stifle speech.
Illinois Procedure and Sanctions Decisions 