Category: Uncategorized

Requesting The Court To Stay Its Decision Is Not Sanctionable

In re Marriage of Yazeji and Assaf, 2021 IL App (3d) 190430-U is an appeal of a decision by a trial court to sanction a litigant for filing a motion to stay the court’s ruling pending an appeal. The appeal involved a parenting plan.

The procedural history:

¶ 2 In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, respondent, Bassam A. Assaf, filed notices of appeal to challenge the trial court’s dissolution judgment and parenting plan. After doing so, Assaf later filed in the trial court a motion to stay the enforcement of the parenting plan while his appeals were pending, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 305(b) (eff. July 1, 2017). Petitioner, May S. Yazeji, filed a motion to strike and dismiss Assaf’s request for a stay, and sought to have Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) sanctions imposed against Assaf for filing a “meritless” motion. Following a hearing, the trial court found that it did not have jurisdiction to rule upon Assaf’s stay request because Assaf had already filed a notice of appeal. The trial court, therefore, granted Yazeji’s motion to strike and dismiss and imposed sanctions on Assaf of nearly $5000 for the attorney fees that Yazeji had incurred defending against the stay request. Assaf appeals. We reverse the trial court’s imposition of sanctions and remand this case with directions to the trial court to enter an order requiring that the sanctions amount be refunded to Assaf, if the sanctions amount has already been paid.

The reasoning:

¶ 14 The trial court’s sanction order in the instant case was based upon its finding that it lacked jurisdiction to rule upon Assaf’s motion to stay after Assaf filed his second notice of appeal. A notice of appeal is a procedural device that when timely filed with the trial court, vests jurisdiction in the appellate court to permit review of the trial court’s judgment. General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 173 (2011). Once a notice of appeal is filed, the jurisdiction of the appellate court attaches instanter, and the cause of action is beyond the trial court’s jurisdiction. Id. The trial court, however, retains jurisdiction after the notice of appeal is filed to determine matters that are collateral or incidental to the judgment. Id. at 173-74. The question here is whether a motion to stay is such a matter.

¶ 15 Supreme Court Rule 305(b), which allows for the filing of the stay request in the instant case, does not state whether a motion to stay is collateral or incidental to the judgment or whether the trial court may rule upon such a motion after an appeal has been filed. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 305(b) (eff. July 1, 2017). Our supreme court, however, has previously indicated that a stay of judgment is collateral to the judgment and does not alter the issues on appeal. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d at 174; Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 526 (2001). We must conclude, therefore, that a trial court may rule upon a motion to stay after a notice of appeal has been filed. See Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d at 173-74; Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 526.

¶ 16 In the present case, Assaf’s stay request was collateral to the trial court’s dissolution judgment and parenting plan. See Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d at 174; Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 526. The trial court, therefore, retained jurisdiction to rule upon Assaf’s motion to stay and was not divested of jurisdiction to do so by Assaf’s filing of the second notice of appeal. See Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d at 173-74; Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 526. The trial court’s ruling to the contrary was legally incorrect. See Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d at 173-74; Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 526. Assaf’s motion to stay was not false or frivolous and could not serve as a basis for Rule 137 sanctions. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 137(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018); Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 7. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed Rule 137 sanctions upon Assaf. See Blum, 235 Ill. 2d at 36; Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d at 460.

Comment: it can become necessary to ask the trial court to stay an interlocutory ruling pending an appeal. Lawyers and litigants should not be sanctioned for doing that.

Ed Clinton, Jr.

Chicago, Illinois

Dog Bite Verdict Upheld

In the case captioned, Claffey v. Huntley, 2021 IL App (1st) 191938 the Illinois Appellate court upheld a verdict in favor of a home owner whose dog allegedly bit the plaintiff (a mail carrier) without provocation. At trial the jury ruled in favor of the homeowner defendant (and by extension the dog). Claffey moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The motion was denied and the Appellate Court affirmed the denial.

Claffey testified that he inserted his hand in the mail slot and it was bitten. He argued that there was no evidence of provocation. The jury and the judge disagreed. The Appellate Court also disagreed, holding that there was evidence of provocation. The explanation:

“In this case the Huntleys secured their dog against contact with outsiders by keeping it insider their home. ‘Securing dogs…is what is expected of a dog owner – it protects the dogs and it protects the innocent public.'” The court further explained that by opening the mail slot, “Claffey encroached on the dog’s isolated environment and exposed himself to risk of harm.” ¶27.

Conclusion: don’t put your hand through the mail slot.

Appellate Court Remands Sanctions Claim to Trial Court

Generally, a litigant has 30 days after final judgment to file a motion for Rule 137 sanctions. In Davis v. Davis, 2019 IL App (3d) 170744, husband filed a breach of contract claim against ex-wife. After his claim was dismissed, the husband appealed and one day later wife moved for Rule 137 sanctions. Because her sanctions motion was timely, the filing of the notice of appeal by the husband did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction.

The explanation:

¶ 18 Having determined that the trial court did not err in dismissing Michael’s breach of contract action, we turn to Leann’s cross-appeal. She raises two issues: whether the trial court erred when it found it lacked jurisdiction to hear her request for sanctions and whether the court should have imposed Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) and Rule 375 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) sanctions on Michael.

¶ 19 We begin with Leann’s challenge to the trial court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction to hear her motion for sanctions. She argues that the trial court erroneously determined that it lacked jurisdiction. Michael agrees. They are correct.

¶ 20 A Rule 137 motion for sanctions must be filed within 30 days after the final judgment was entered. Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017), a judgment or order does not become final and appealable while a Rule 137 claim remains pending. This is true even when a notice of appeal was filed in the same proceeding prior to the filing of the motion for sanctions. Yunker v. Farmers Automobile Management Corp., 404 Ill. App. 3d 816, 821 (2010). A timely postjudgment motion, such as a motion for sanctions, operates to stay an earlier filed notice of appeal. In re Estate of Hanley, 2013 IL App (3d) 110264, ¶ 43. The notice of appeal becomes effective when the final postjudgment motion is decided. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017). We review questions of jurisdiction de novo. In re Marriage of Chrobak, 349 Ill. App. 3d 894, 897 (2004).

¶ 21 The trial court granted Leann’s motion to dismiss on October 3, 2017. Michael filed a notice of appeal on November 1, 2017, and Leann filed her motion for sanctions on November 2, 2017. The trial court dismissed Leann’s motion for sanctions on January 11, 2018, finding it lacked jurisdiction because a notice of appeal had already been filed. However, the motion for sanctions was a timely filed postjudgment motion that prevents an earlier filed notice of appeal from becoming effective until the trial court enters its ruling on the sanctions motion. The trial court retained jurisdiction to determine Leann’s sanctions motion. Thus, the trial court erred when it found it lacked jurisdiction to decide the motion for sanctions. We accordingly remand for the trial court to hear and determine Leann’s motion for sanctions.

Comment: thus, the filing of a notice of appeal by one party does not prevent the other party from seeking sanctions. The Clinton Law Firm