Tag: technology

AI Usage Sanctions In Human Rights Appeal

Scott v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 2026 IL App (1st) 251462, is an appeal from a decision of the Illinois Human Rights Commission. Kimberly Scott, an African American woman who worked at a Starbucks in downtown Chicago, filed a workplace racial discrimination charge against Starbucks in 2022 after being disciplined for misgendering a coworker (she alleged the discipline was racially motivated). She dual-filed her charge with both the EEOC and the Illinois Department of Human Rights.

The EEOC investigated first (as required when a charge is dual-filed) and dismissed her charge in August 2022. Under the Illinois Human Rights Act, once the EEOC issues its determination, the complainant has 30 days to submit that determination to the Department in order for the Department to have jurisdiction to proceed. Scott didn’t submit the EEOC’s determination to the Department until roughly 175 days later — well past the deadline.

Despite this, the Department (and later the Commission) initially proceeded to investigate and rule on the merits without flagging the timeliness problem. Only after Scott sought a second round of review before the Commission did the Department raise the jurisdictional defect for the first time, and the Commission ultimately sustained dismissal of her charge on that basis (lack of jurisdiction due to the untimely submission), while also noting the charge would fail on the merits anyway for insufficient evidence of discrimination.

Scott petitioned the Illinois Appellate Court for review of that Commission decision. The court affirmed, holding that the 30-day submission deadline is jurisdictional and cannot be equitably tolled — even though the agencies had themselves proceeded for years as though they had jurisdiction before raising the issue.

The opinion is notable, however, less for that jurisdictional holding than for what happens alongside it: the court used the case as a vehicle to sanction Scott’s attorney, Mason Cole, for filing briefs riddled with AI-hallucinated case citations and fabricated statutory quotations.

1. Fabricated statutory quotations (Rule 341(h)(5) violation) Cole’s brief attributed language to four different statutory/regulatory provisions that doesn’t exist in them:

  • Claimed § 7A-102(D)(2) required a “full investigation” — it doesn’t; that language is invented.
  • Claimed Code § 5300.530(b) governed reconsideration standards — it actually governs ALJ rulings on motions, unrelated.
  • Misquoted § 8-111(B)(1)’s judicial review language.
  • Invented “vigorous enforcement” language in § 1-102(A).

2. Fake and misused case citations

  • Cited Harris v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 2022 IL App (1st) 210454 — this case doesn’t exist at all. The citation number actually corresponds to an unrelated criminal case.
  • Attributed holdings/definitions to real cases that don’t contain them (Gusciara, Village of Oak Lawn, Abrahamson).
  • Cited cases for propositions they don’t support — e.g., citing Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality for the idea that courts “routinely decline to strike briefs,” when that paragraph of Hall actually supports striking briefs as a sanction.

3. Improper statement of facts — cited to the brief’s appendix rather than the actual record on appeal, violating Rule 341(h)(6).

4. Made things worse in the show-cause response When ordered to explain himself, Cole’s response itself contained new legal errors:

  • Cited a statutory subsection that was repealed in 2008.
  • Misattributed and misquoted another subsection.
  • Quoted several cases verbatim without quotation marks (a separate plagiarism-adjacent problem).
  • Ignored the court’s explicit order to include pin cites for six citations.
  • Called the misconduct mere “technical deficiencies” rather than owning it, and his reply brief had repeated one of the false quotations after opposing counsel flagged it — which the court treated as evidence of willfulness rather than carelessness.

5. The underlying explanation Cole said he used a “premier corporate subscription of ChatGPT” and claimed he “cross-referenced” citations on Lexis but “overlooked” the fabrications — an explanation the court didn’t find persuasive, especially since his own show-cause response repeated the pattern. The court was exasperated with him.

¶ 59 In addition, the clerk of the Appellate Court, First District, shall send a copy of this opinion to the ARDC. See Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, ¶ 132. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires us to “inform the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission” if “a lawyer has committed a violation of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010 that raises a substantial question regarding the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” Ill. Code Jud. Conduct (2023), Canon 2, R. 2.15(B) (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). Here, attorney Cole repeatedly misrepresented the law to this court even after his opponent identified his misstatements to this court and even after being warned that the court was considering sanctions.

Moreover, in his response, attorney Cole claims that his “inability to properly verify the cites is a result of [his] inexperience in appellate court.” But attorneys verify citations the same way in every court, so this claim raises questions about attorney Cole’s fitness to practice law generally.

Consequences:

  • $15,000 fine ($1,500 per false citation/quotation — 10 total), calibrated deliberately higher than prior Illinois cases (which had used $1,000/$500 splits) to signal that fabrication type doesn’t matter — all misstatements of law get the same treatment.
  • Referral to the ARDC for potential discipline.
  • The court declined to strike the brief or dismiss the appeal (since the record was sufficient for it to resolve the merits itself) and declined to order CLE attendance or notice-to-other-judges, reasoning Rule 375 likely doesn’t authorize those additional sanctions.
  • The court found Cole’s central merits argument (the “full investigation” theory) was itself frivolous under Rule 375(b) precisely because it rested on the fabricated statutory language.

Notably, the court frames this squarely as an ethics violation, not just a briefing defect — citing Rules 1.1 (competence, including “benefits and risks associated with relevant technology”), 3.1 (frivolous filings), 3.3(a)(1) (candor to the tribunal), and 8.4(c) (dishonesty/misrepresentation), and reiterating the zero-tolerance standard: no citation should appear in a filing that counsel hasn’t personally read and verified, regardless of source.

Comment: please be careful when using chatbots to do legal work. They are not qualified and have not passed the bar exam. They really don’t get it. They aren’t lawyers. They have no shame. They won’t feel guilt if they screw up as you would.

Edward X. Clinton, Jr.

Lawyers Sanctioned For Filing Suit When They Had Client Sign Arbitration Agreement

In Johnson and Bell, Ltd., v. Scherer, 2024 IL App (1st) 230709-U, the law firm sued a former client to collect an unpaid fee bill. However, the engagement letter signed by the client and the law firm required that all disputes between the parties be submitted to binding arbitration. Because the firm failed to pursue this remedy, the defendant sought Rule 137 sanctions. The trial court denied the motion for sanctions. The Appellate Court reversed and held that the denial of sanctions was an abuse of discretion.

The reasoning:

¶28 We conclude that the instant case warrants a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants’ motion for Rule 137 sanctions against plaintiff….First, although plaintiff filed the original complaint without any reference to the parties’ engagement agreements, plaintiff does not deny, nor can it, that it was aware of the existence of these agreements when it filed the original complaint. Plaintiff is a law firm and drafted the engagement agreements that contain the unambiguous and broad mandatory arbitration provision for disputes involving any dispute under the agreement, including disputes regarding the amount of fees or the quality of plaintiff’s services. Consequently, even the most basic level of “reasonable investigation” as mandated by Rule 137 would have required plaintiff to examine the engagement agreements and their provisions before plaintiff signed and filed the original complaint.

¶ 30 Furthermore, plaintiff’s argument that it properly filed the original and amended complaints because the parties could waive the contractual provision for mandatory, binding arbitration lacks merit. Based upon the objective standard used to measure the circumstances at the time plaintiff filed its pleadings, it is irrelevant that plaintiff believed waiver of the arbitration provision was a possibility. Furthermore, plaintiff’s response to defendants’ motion to dismiss and compel arbitration—i.e., that defendants had waived their right to arbitration by moving to dismiss plaintiff’s original complaint based on plaintiff’s failure to abide by pleading requirements and attach the engagement agreements—is clearly contrary to precedent. Illinois courts clearly favor the easier, more expeditious, and less expensive contractual right of arbitration for dispute resolution and will not lightly infer the waiver of that contractual right. All American Roofing, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Co., 404 Ill. App. 3d 438, 441 (2010)….

¶33 …[E]ven a cursory examination by plaintiff of the engagement agreements here would have indicated that the challenged complaints were barred by the arbitration provision and, therefore, should not have been filed before obtaining a waiver fro defendants. Furthermore, instead of promptly dismissing the lawsuit that clearly was subject to mandatory arbitration ….plaintiff doubled down by filing the amended complaint and responding to defendants’ motion to dismiss and compel arbitration with the baseless argument that defendants had waived their right to mandatory arbitration by moving to dismiss the original complaint….

The court reversed the denial of the motion for Rule 137 sanctions and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Comment: the opinion is well-reasoned and appropriate. Arbitration can be inconvenient to those familiar with courtrooms and court proceedings. However, the firm agreed to arbitration and was required to arbitrate. The opinion states that the firm obtained a fee award in the arbitration.

http://www.clintonlaw.net