Category: Appellate Procedure

AI Strikes Again- Appeal Dismissed

P-Three Development, LLC v. Therm Flo, Inc., 2026 IL App (1st) 250567-U

Disposition: Appeal dismissed; intervenor-appellant’s brief stricken under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341.

Background: This is a sprawling underlying dispute over data center equipment in Mount Prospect, Illinois, stemming from a 2014 settlement note that was later assigned to P-Three Development, LLC when it purchased one of the data centers in 2015. As part of that purchase, P-Three (through its sole manager, Ravi Kadiyala) executed a release discharging the “Pressman defendants” from claims on the note. Despite that release, P-Three sued in 2021 anyway, and when defendants moved for summary judgment based on the release, P-Three/Kadiyala claimed the release was a forgery. The circuit court granted summary judgment for defendants (finding the release valid) and imposed Rule 137 sanctions after finding Kadiyala’s forgery claims were false — discovery showed he had in fact signed and transmitted the release.

The intervention issue: After P-Three’s own attorneys withdrew and it went unrepresented, Kadiyala tried to keep litigating pro se on P-Three’s behalf, which the trial court rejected since he wasn’t a party. He then filed a formal petition to intervene individually under 735 ILCS 5/2-408(a)(3), which the trial court denied, finding he hadn’t shown he’d benefit or suffer from the litigation’s outcome. Kadiyala appealed that denial.

Why the appeal was dismissed: The court didn’t reach the merits of the intervention question. Instead, it focused on serious Rule 341 compliance problems in Kadiyala’s appellate brief:

  • He misquoted the actual statutory text of section 2-408(a)(3).
  • He cited four entirely fictitious cases (Greer, S.I.T.E., Hartigan (the fake one), and a fabricated Ortega citation), complete with invented quotes and holdings.
  • He cited several real cases (the actual E&E Hauling, Zivin, Bilyk, Smith, and Himmel decisions) but attributed fabricated quotes and holdings to them that bore no relationship to what those cases actually addressed.

The court noted these hallmarks strongly suggested undisclosed use of generative AI in drafting the brief, and — citing the Fourth District’s recent In re Baby Boy decision — reiterated that the Illinois Supreme Court’s AI policy permits AI use but requires attorneys (and, per Holzrichter, pro se litigants held to the same standard) to verify AI-generated content before filing. Because the fabrications were pervasive rather than an isolated slip, the court exercised its discretion to strike the brief and dismiss the appeal outright rather than proceed to the merits, declining to address the abuse-of-discretion standard of review issue on intervention or the substantive section 2-408(a)(3) arguments at all.

Appellate Brief Stricken By Court – Possible AI Use

In Cole v. Lee, 2026 IL App (1st) 252223-U, the appellate court struck Cole’s brief and dismissed his appeal entirely for violations of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) — the rule requiring an appellant’s brief to support its argument with citations to authority. The problems fell into two related categories:

1. Misattributing propositions to cases that don’t support them

Cole cited real, correctly-identified cases but claimed they stood for propositions they simply didn’t contain:

  • He cited Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100 (2005), for the proposition that Consumer Fraud Act damages claims are legal claims triable to a jury — but the court found nothing in Averysupporting that.
  • He cited People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Systems Corp., 146 Ill. 2d 1 (1991), for the proposition that when legal and equitable issues are joined, the legal issues must go to a jury — again, unsupported by the actual case.

2. Miscited case citations (wrong volume/page combinations)

Beyond mischaracterizing holdings, several of his citations didn’t correspond to the cases he named at all:

  • “Stephens v. Kasten, 334 Ill. App. 3d 1004″ — Stephens is actually a supreme court case at 383 Ill. 127 (1943); the citation he gave instead landed on an unrelated criminal case, People v. Lewis.
  • “In re Estate of Mulvaney, 288 Ill. App. 3d 464″ — Mulvaney actually begins at 128 Ill. App. 3d 133 (1984); his citation instead pointed to a different criminal case, People v. Lambert.
  • The court noted the same pattern recurred with his citations to Kaiser v. MEPC American Properties and Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine — and that these were just the errors in the firstof three argument subsections.

Why this was fatal rather than just criticized

The court invoked the principle that a reviewing court is “entitled to have the issues clearly defined and supported by pertinent authority” and is not obligated to “act as an advocate or seek error in the record” on the appellant’s behalf (quoting U.S. Bank v. Lindsey). Rule 341(h)(7)’s citation requirement implicitly demands accurate citations — citing to nothing, or to the wrong case, defeats the purpose of the rule and shifts the research burden onto the court.

The court also stressed two aggravating points:

  • Cole’s pro se status didn’t excuse compliance with the rules, and pro se status doesn’t earn him extra leniency (citing People v. Shunick, 2024 IL 129244).
  • Cole had a documented pattern — the opinion lists eight other appeals where he’d committed similar Rule 341 violations, two of which had already resulted in stricken briefs and dismissed appeals.

Given that history, the court treated this as a case where striking the brief and dismissing the appeal (an admittedly “drastic” remedy per Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality) was warranted, citing Ammar v. Schiller, DuCanto & Fleck, LLP as support for that outcome given repeated, escalating noncompliance.

Rule 341(h)(7) citation accuracy isn’t a formality — courts treat fabricated or unsupported legal propositions as substantively undermining the entire brief, not just a technical defect in one section. This looks like a case where a pro se litigant used AI to create a brief and the AI struggled.

Failure To Present Complete Record Defeats Sanctions Appeal

In Green v. McDonald, 2025 IL App (4th) 240759, the Appellate court affirmed the denial of a Rule 137 motion. The plaintiff had sued to obtain visitation with her “half-siblings” who were minors. She lost. Defendant moved for sanctions, which were denied by the trial court. Defendant’s appeal was unsuccessful.

¶ 30 Section 602.9(c) of the Marriage Act authorizes siblings of a minor child to petition the trial court for visitation if there is an unreasonable denial of visitation by a parent that causes undue mental, physical, or emotional harm to the child and the child’s other parent is deceased. 750 ILCS 5/602.9(c) (West 2020). A sibling may do so by filing a petition in the dissolution proceeding or any other proceeding that involves visitation issues regarding the child. 750 ILCS 5/602.9(b)(1) (West 2020).

¶ 31 Here, respondent focuses on what he characterizes was a “complete lack of any proof” of undue harm to the minors, which he contends is sanctionable under Rule 137. However, respondent, who was quick to note the perceived deficiencies of petitioner’s pro se brief, has not provided a report of proceedings on appeal to show the evidence petitioner presented at the hearing. We could spend time commenting on respondent’s violations of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which requires a statement of facts “which shall contain the facts necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment” (emphasis added), but need not.

¶ 32 “[A]n appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error, and in the absence of such a record on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis. Any doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.” Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958, 959 (1984). In the absence of a complete record, especially when the abuse-of-discretion standard applies, we must presume that the trial court acted properly. See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392 (without a transcript of the hearing on the motion, “there is no basis for holding that the trial court abused discretion in denying the motion”).

¶ 33 Given the lack of a record of the evidence petitioner actually provided at the hearing, we cannot determine she completely failed in her attempt to prove her case. Meanwhile, as previously noted, Rule 137’s purpose is not to penalize an unsuccessful party. Miller, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 976. While the trial court factually found there was no evidence of undue harm, the court noted petitioner’s attempt at proving the undue harm through evidence of her previously good relationship with the minors and her argument there was an inference the unreasonable termination caused the minors’ emotional distress or mental harm. We further note the record contains material supporting the court’s conclusion the termination was indeed unreasonable. Petitioner’s argument to the court also included assertions respondent had expressed anger in the presence of the minors, which petitioner argued provided an inference of undue harm. That petitioner was ultimately unable to convince the court to accept her inference does not mean the pleading she filed was not well-grounded in fact and not warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

Comment: failing to provide a complete record allowed the court to affirm the denial of sanctions without discussion of the merits.

You Cannot Appeal Until the Judgment Is Final

One issue that arises often in our great State of Illinois is that an appeal is dismissed because there was no final judgment. This case – see below – is one such case. National Life issued a citation to discover assets to International Bank. A citation to discover assets can be issued when a party has a judgment. The citation requires the responding party to certify whether or not it has any assets. The responding party must answer the citation under oath. If there are assets, those assets must be frozen until the court can determine what to do with them.

The facts are fairly straightforward. National Life obtained a judgment against Ronald Scarlato and two LLCs. National Life then served a citation upon IBC. IBC, believing that it had no assets of Scarlato, disbursed certain loan proceeds to third parties.

The court explains the procedural history as follows:

¶ 3 On either November 14, 2012 or November 28, 2012,[1] National Life obtained a judgment in the amount of $3,424,228.97 against Scarlato and two limited liability corporations, jointly and severally. Subsequently, National Life initiated supplementary proceedings. On April 12, 2013, National Life filed a third-party citation to discover assets directed to IBC. The citation was served via certified mail on April 13, 2013. The citation that was served upon IBC contained the following prohibitive provision:

“[You are prohibited] from making or allowing any transfer or other disposition of, or interfering with, any property not exempt from execution or garnishment belonging to the judgment debtor or to which the judgment debtor may be entitled or which may be acquired by or become due to the judgment debtor and from paying over or otherwise disposing of any money not so exempt, which is due or becomes due to the judgment debtor, until further order of court or termination of the proceedings. You are not required to withhold the payment of any money beyond double the amount of the judgment.”

¶ 4 On August 1, 2013, Scarlato, Bellwood Place, LLC (BP), and Scarlato Holdings Bellwood Place, LLC (SHBP) entered into a construction loan agreement and promissory note with IBC wherein IBC agreed to loan $3.5 million to Scarlato, BP, and SHBP. From August 2013 to March 2014, IBC disbursed $3.5 million in loan proceeds to various third-parties. None of the loan proceeds were disbursed to Scarlato.

¶ 5 On July 18, 2014, National Life filed a motion for entry of judgment against IBC for violating the third-party citation to discover assets that was served on April 13, 2013. The motion sought judgment pursuant to section 2-1402 of the Code (Id.) and argued that IBC violated the prohibitive provision of the citation and the lien created thereby when it transferred $3.5 million in assets that belonged to Scarlato. On July 30, 2014, IBC filed its response and asserted that it never violated the citation because the loan proceeds never amounted to Scarlato’s “property” as contemplated by the citation’s prohibitive provision. National Life filed its reply on August 19, 2014, and the court held an evidentiary hearing on December 16, 2014.

¶ 6 The court set forth its ruling in a written memorandum decision and order that was entered on April 15, 2015. The court’s order denied National Life’s motion for entry of judgment against IBC, finding that the loan proceeds were not Scarlato’s individually. Specifically, the court’s order read, “[T]he checks clearly show the amounts were delivered to entities and not Scarlato individually. The [c]ourt recognizes the frustration in this matter. However, the parties do have remedies remaining.”

¶ 7 National Life filed its timely notice of appeal on May 14, 2015.

The problem, of course, was that the appeal was dismissed because there was no final judgment. National Life could still proceed with its citation. There was thus no final resolution of the issue and no final judgment. Thus, the time spent on the appeal was wasted.

Edward  X. Clinton, Jr.

Source: NATIONAL LIFE REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC v. INTERNATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, Ill: Appellate Court, 1st Dist., 1st Div. 2016 – Google Scholar