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Failure To Present Complete Record Defeats Sanctions Appeal

In Green v. McDonald, 2025 IL App (4th) 240759, the Appellate court affirmed the denial of a Rule 137 motion. The plaintiff had sued to obtain visitation with her “half-siblings” who were minors. She lost. Defendant moved for sanctions, which were denied by the trial court. Defendant’s appeal was unsuccessful.

¶ 30 Section 602.9(c) of the Marriage Act authorizes siblings of a minor child to petition the trial court for visitation if there is an unreasonable denial of visitation by a parent that causes undue mental, physical, or emotional harm to the child and the child’s other parent is deceased. 750 ILCS 5/602.9(c) (West 2020). A sibling may do so by filing a petition in the dissolution proceeding or any other proceeding that involves visitation issues regarding the child. 750 ILCS 5/602.9(b)(1) (West 2020).

¶ 31 Here, respondent focuses on what he characterizes was a “complete lack of any proof” of undue harm to the minors, which he contends is sanctionable under Rule 137. However, respondent, who was quick to note the perceived deficiencies of petitioner’s pro se brief, has not provided a report of proceedings on appeal to show the evidence petitioner presented at the hearing. We could spend time commenting on respondent’s violations of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which requires a statement of facts “which shall contain the facts necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment” (emphasis added), but need not.

¶ 32 “[A]n appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error, and in the absence of such a record on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis. Any doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.” Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958, 959 (1984). In the absence of a complete record, especially when the abuse-of-discretion standard applies, we must presume that the trial court acted properly. See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392 (without a transcript of the hearing on the motion, “there is no basis for holding that the trial court abused discretion in denying the motion”).

¶ 33 Given the lack of a record of the evidence petitioner actually provided at the hearing, we cannot determine she completely failed in her attempt to prove her case. Meanwhile, as previously noted, Rule 137’s purpose is not to penalize an unsuccessful party. Miller, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 976. While the trial court factually found there was no evidence of undue harm, the court noted petitioner’s attempt at proving the undue harm through evidence of her previously good relationship with the minors and her argument there was an inference the unreasonable termination caused the minors’ emotional distress or mental harm. We further note the record contains material supporting the court’s conclusion the termination was indeed unreasonable. Petitioner’s argument to the court also included assertions respondent had expressed anger in the presence of the minors, which petitioner argued provided an inference of undue harm. That petitioner was ultimately unable to convince the court to accept her inference does not mean the pleading she filed was not well-grounded in fact and not warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

Comment: failing to provide a complete record allowed the court to affirm the denial of sanctions without discussion of the merits.

Lawyers Sanctioned For Filing Suit When They Had Client Sign Arbitration Agreement

In Johnson and Bell, Ltd., v. Scherer, 2024 IL App (1st) 230709-U, the law firm sued a former client to collect an unpaid fee bill. However, the engagement letter signed by the client and the law firm required that all disputes between the parties be submitted to binding arbitration. Because the firm failed to pursue this remedy, the defendant sought Rule 137 sanctions. The trial court denied the motion for sanctions. The Appellate Court reversed and held that the denial of sanctions was an abuse of discretion.

The reasoning:

¶28 We conclude that the instant case warrants a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants’ motion for Rule 137 sanctions against plaintiff….First, although plaintiff filed the original complaint without any reference to the parties’ engagement agreements, plaintiff does not deny, nor can it, that it was aware of the existence of these agreements when it filed the original complaint. Plaintiff is a law firm and drafted the engagement agreements that contain the unambiguous and broad mandatory arbitration provision for disputes involving any dispute under the agreement, including disputes regarding the amount of fees or the quality of plaintiff’s services. Consequently, even the most basic level of “reasonable investigation” as mandated by Rule 137 would have required plaintiff to examine the engagement agreements and their provisions before plaintiff signed and filed the original complaint.

¶ 30 Furthermore, plaintiff’s argument that it properly filed the original and amended complaints because the parties could waive the contractual provision for mandatory, binding arbitration lacks merit. Based upon the objective standard used to measure the circumstances at the time plaintiff filed its pleadings, it is irrelevant that plaintiff believed waiver of the arbitration provision was a possibility. Furthermore, plaintiff’s response to defendants’ motion to dismiss and compel arbitration—i.e., that defendants had waived their right to arbitration by moving to dismiss plaintiff’s original complaint based on plaintiff’s failure to abide by pleading requirements and attach the engagement agreements—is clearly contrary to precedent. Illinois courts clearly favor the easier, more expeditious, and less expensive contractual right of arbitration for dispute resolution and will not lightly infer the waiver of that contractual right. All American Roofing, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Co., 404 Ill. App. 3d 438, 441 (2010)….

¶33 …[E]ven a cursory examination by plaintiff of the engagement agreements here would have indicated that the challenged complaints were barred by the arbitration provision and, therefore, should not have been filed before obtaining a waiver fro defendants. Furthermore, instead of promptly dismissing the lawsuit that clearly was subject to mandatory arbitration ….plaintiff doubled down by filing the amended complaint and responding to defendants’ motion to dismiss and compel arbitration with the baseless argument that defendants had waived their right to mandatory arbitration by moving to dismiss the original complaint….

The court reversed the denial of the motion for Rule 137 sanctions and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Comment: the opinion is well-reasoned and appropriate. Arbitration can be inconvenient to those familiar with courtrooms and court proceedings. However, the firm agreed to arbitration and was required to arbitrate. The opinion states that the firm obtained a fee award in the arbitration.

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